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Directorate of Intelligence

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IMC/CB

Afghanistan Situation Report

25X1

25 January 1983

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25 January 1983

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0015	S ASKED MASOOD	FOR CEASEFIRE LAST	DECEMBER		
OVIET			/ + 1	he Soviets wanted	
OVIE1	truce around (Christmas to with	draw their or	wn and Afghan Arm	
OVIET			un the Velle-	O	
OVIE1	troops from Rol	kha, 25 kilometers clined to agree	but felt he l	had little to gain	y
30 V 1E1	troops from Rol Masood was in	kha, 25 kilometers clined to agree cuation of Rokha.	but felt he l	had little to gain	y
SOVIE1	troops from Rol Masood was in	clined to agree	but felt he i	had little to gain	y
60 V IE1	troops from Rol Masood was in	clined to agree	but felt he i	had little to gain	y
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OVIET	troops from Rol Masood was in	clined to agree	but felt he i	had little to gain	y
SOVIET	troops from Rol Masood was in	clined to agree	but felt he i	25 January 198 NESA M 83-10018C	n 3

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say that a Soviet/Afghan	reports that several Panjaheri sources negotiating team went to the valley in	
sent a lieutenant to the		
Masood later refused the	offer but said he would be happy to stop	
fighting after Soviet for	ces left Afghanistan.	٦
Comment:		
	The Soviets may withdrawal offer as bait to lure Masood	
into talks and then us	e the meeting to brand Masoud as a	
collaborator to discredit	him as an insurgent leader. Both the	
collaborator to discredit Soviets and the insurgen however, indicating that	him as an insurgent leader. Both the its have kept quiet about the meeting, any "agreement" may still be in effect	
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VIET E	FFORTS HURTING INSURGENTS IN QANDAHAR PROVINCE	2
	Soviet helicopters have been airlifting troops and vehicles	
t	o the Pakistan border area to ambush insurgent supply convoys.	
В	etween 16 and 26 December eight ambushes stopped insurgent	
	raffic along supply routes to the east of the border town of	
	pin-Buldak. the Soviets had	
	mproved their air and ground tactics to protect convoys around andahar city.	
Ų.	andanar Crty.	
<u>C</u>	omment: The Soviets have made little, if any, progress in	
d	eveloping an effective counterinsurgency strategy, but they have	
	aken advantage of favorable terrain and continue to develop and	
	est new tactics to make better use of their forces. The	
D.	elatively flat and arid land in most of Qandahar province is oor guerrilla-warfare territory but is well suited to operations	
b.	y the Soviet motorized brigade and air units stationed at	
•	andahar city. The heliborne operations show that the Soviets	
O:	ealize the importance of infiltrated supplies and men to	
	uerrilla operations and are taking new measures to cut insurgent	
r		
r g s	upply lines. To counter the new tactics, the insurgents will	
g s n	upply lines. To counter the new tactics, the insurgents will eed more anti-aircraft weapons near Qandahar city and will have	
r g s	upply lines. To counter the new tactics, the insurgents will	;

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SHAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN-FIGHTING CONTINUES	25
a major split has occurred within the Afghan Communist Party over the drafting of men from certain Pushtun border tribes, who have been traditionally exempt	25
from military service. The controversy has pitted non-Pushtuns (Prime Minister Keshtmand) and detribalized "Kabuli" Pushtuns (Defense Minister Qader and probably President Babrak) against Parchamists and Khalqis from the Pushtun provinces.	25
Comment: The tribes in question have been exempt from military service since the early 1930s, because they helped part of the Afghan royal family gain power. The controversey demonstrates that ethnic and tribal animosities are still strong within the Communist party.	25
BRIEF	
Afghan refugees in Europe and America are attempting to organize an effort to replace the delegation from Kabul with one representing the resistance at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in New Delhi in March.	25
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